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CERTIORARI POWER OF THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT
TO REVIEW DECISIONS OF THE DISTRICT
COURTS OF APPEAL
DANIEL H. JAMES*

Almost three years have elapsed since the effective date of the new
constitutional amendment' which governs Florida's judicial system. Among
the most profound changes brought about by the amendment are the limitations placed upon the certiorari jurisdiction of the supreme court, as
opposed to its previously unlimited jurisdiction. 2 For most purposes, the
newly created district courts of appeal are final appellate courts.
In a number of opinions the supreme court has made a concerted
effort to apprise the Bar of the limitations placed upon its power of
review.3 It should be noted that even though it can be shown that the
supreme court has jurisdiction to review by certiorari, the court, at its
discretion may refuse to exercise this power. 4 The scope of this article
is limited to a survey of the interpretation and treatment of that part
of the new constitutional amendment which limits the supreme court's
jurisdictional power to review, by certiorari, the decisions of the district
courts of appeal.

1. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(2): "The supreme court may review by certiorari
any decision of a district court of appeal that affects a class of constitutional or state
officers, or that passes upon a question certified by the district court of appeal to be
of great public interest, or that is in direct conflict with a decision of another district
court of appeal or of the supreme court on the same point of law.... ." This
amendment was adopted on November 6, 1956, and became effective on July 1, 1957.
2. Nielson v. City of Sarasota, 117 So.2d 731, 734 (Fla. 1960).
3. See N & L Auto Parts Co. v. Doman, 117 So.2d 410 (Fla. 1960); Seaboard
Air Line R.R. v. Branham, 104 So.2d 356 (Fla. 1958); Lake v. Lake, 103 So.2d 639
(Fla. 1958); Ansin v. Tlurston, 101 So.2d 808 (Fla. 1958), wherein it is stated at p. 811
as a justification for the court's time and effort: "It is of obvious importance that
there should be developed consistent rules for limiting issuance of the writ of certiorari
to cases involving principles the settlement of which is of importance to the public, as
distinguished from that of the parties, and in cases where there is a real and embarrassing
conflict of opinion and authority between decisions."
4. Certiorari is not granted as a matter of course. It lies in the sound judicial
discretion of the reviewing court. State v. Live Oak, P. & G.R.R., 70 Fla. 564,
70 So. 550 (1915); Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Ray, 52 Fla. 634, 42 So. 714 (1906).
The enabling provision, supra note 1, through the consistent use of the words "may
review" plainly makes the reviewing power discretionary as opposed to mandatory. See
Walker v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 101 So.2d 437 (Fla. App.), cert. denied
without opinion, 102 So.2d 728 (Fla. 1958), as an example of the supreme court's
refusal to exercise its power of review. The supreme court's power to review district
courts of appeal decisions by appeal is a matter of right to the litigant, and such
jurisdiction is obligatory. Generally, the litigant may appeal "only from decisions
initially passing upon the validity of a state statute or a federal statute or treaty, or
initially construing a controlling provision of the Florida or federal constitution" by
the district court of appeal. FLA. CONSr. art. V, § 4(2).
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CERTIORARI POWER
CERTIFIED QUESTIONS FROM DISTRICT COURTS OF APPEAL

The certificatory provision of the Florida Constitution provides that
"the supreme court may review by certiorari any decision of a district
court of appeal . . . that passes upon a question certified by the district
court of appeal to be of great public interest. .. ."

The important thing to note under this provision is that the district
court of appeal must sanction the review by certifying the question 6
and the task of the litigant becomes one of persuading the district court
that the question should be certified.' Prudence should dictate, however,
that the petition to certify should not be filed in the district court until
that court has passed upon the question.8
Once the district court of appeal determines that the question is
one of "great public interest," that determination is not open for review
by the supreme court.0 In Susco Car Rental System of Florida v. Leonard,10
the district court of appeal held a car rental company liable for the
negligence of a driver who had borrowed the car from the original
rental-bailee. By the oral and written terms of the rental contract, such
operation of the car was unauthorized. Subsequently, the liability question
was certified to the supreme court. The respondent, contesting jurisdiction,
contended that the question was not one of "great public interest" in a
constitutional sense. 1 The supreme court held that the language of the
2
constitution forbade review of that part of the district court's decision.'
5. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(2). In the federal practice, the United States
Supreme Court's jurisdiction to review questions certified by the Courts of Appeal is
obligatory, 28 U.S.C. § 1254(3) (1958). See STERN & GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT
PRACTICE 257-263 (2d ed. 1954). The United States Supreme Court has been able to
effectively control the number of cases certified by expressing admonition when the
question was not a substantially important one. See Biddle v. Luvisch, 266 U.S. 173,
175 (1924); Boston Store of Chicago v. American Graphophone Co., 246 U.S. 8, 16
(1918).
6. United States v. Dahlberg, 120 So.2d 585 (Fla. 1960). The costs incurred in
having the supreme court review a certified question are divided between the litigants.
FLA. APP. RULE 4.6(e).
7. Cases in which questions were deemed to be of "great public interest"
other than those discussed infra are: Collins v. Coastal Petroleum Co., 118 So.2d 796
(Fla. App. 1960) (whether the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund were
without lawful authority to repudiate their action in authorizing a corporation to
recover all minerals from certain described areas of gulf, river and lake bottoms);
Carraway v. Revell, 112 So.2d 71 (Fla. App. 1959) (the character of gross negligence
necessary to sustain recovery under the Florida guest statute, the court taking judicial
notice that trial courts throughout the state were applying different standards which
effected the right of litigants as well as the interest of the insurers).
8. See Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry. v. Pope, 74 Fed. 1, 10 (7th Cir. 1896),
wherein it was stated in response to a motion that certain questions in the case be
certified: "If the suggestion of counsel may be entertained that a question in the
cause should for any reason be certified, the suggestion must come at the argument
of the case upon its merits when the court can be fully advised whether the questions
involved are so intricate and doubtful and essential to be resolved that the instruction
of the supreme court is necessary or desirable."
9. Susco Car Rental Sys. of Fla. v. Leonard, 112 So.2d 832 (Fla. 1959).
10. 103 So.2d 243 (Fla. App. 1958).
11. Supra note 9 at 834.
12. Supra note 9 at 835.
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An analogy was drawn to the practice in other jurisdictions with reference
to conflicts among intermediate appellate courts. When it is provided
the
that the question in conflict may be certified to the higher court,
3
reviewing court cannot inquire as to whether there is a conflict.'
In Walker v. United States Fidelity 6 Guaranty Co., 14 the district
court had before it the question of whether a surety on an official bond,
furnished by a deputy sheriff, was liable in damages for the unlawful acts
of the deputy sheriff while under color of his office, as distinguished
from acts done by virtue of his office.' 5 In 1939, the supreme court in
Malone v. Howell"' had dceided this same question in favor of the surety.
The district court probably had some doubt as to the propriety of the
Malone decision, but apparently felt compelled to adhere to it under
the.doctrine of stare decisis.17 The appellant petitioned the district court
to certify the question to the supreme court. 18 His contention was that
the doctrine announced in the Malone case had been discredited by recent
decisions rendered in other jurisdictions, and that there had been a change
in conditions and philosophies of government which had found their
place in the jurisprudence of Florida.' 0 A majority of the court ruled
that the question was one of great public interest and certified it to the
supreme court. Judge Sturgis dissented, 20 being persuaded that the question
was moot; that the authorities supporting the Malone decision were
sound; and that the question did not have the constitutional importance
ascribed to it by the certificate. Judge Sturgis' meaning attached to
"moot" was not explained. Certainly, it was not moot in the sense that
a supreme court decision on review could not change the effect of the
district court decision on the litigants. 21 If it' was meant that a question
that has been previously decided by the supreme court is no longer
22
a "question" in the constitutional sense, the dissenting position is tenable.
13. 2 AM. JUR. Appeal and Error § 14 (1954), and cases cited. The Florida
Supreme Court review of district courts of appeal decisions involving conflicts is
discussed infra.
14. 101 So.2d 437 (Fla. App. 1958).
15. The bond and liability thereon is provided for in FLA. STAT. § 30.09(1) (1959).
16. 140 Fla. 693, 192 So. 224 (1939).
17. Walker v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 101 So.2d 437, 438-9 (Fla. App.
1958).
18. Id. at 438.
19. Ibid.
20. See note 17 supra at 439.
21. See Carraway v. Revell, 116 So.2d 16, 19 (Fla. 1959), where the supreme
court, on review of a certified question, modified the district court's order and
remanded the case for further proceedings.
22. At least two federal courts of appeal have taken this position with reference
to certifying questions to the United States Supreme Court. Glynn v. Krippner,
60 F.2d 406, 409 (8th Cir. 1932): "When a question has been decided by the
Supreme Court, it is, so far as the inferior federal courts are concerned, a question
no longer."; Lau Ow Bew v. United States, 47 Fed. 641, 645 (9th Cir. 1891):
"We cannot put ourselves in the attitude of asking instructions upon a point
already decided." See Joyner v. Bernard, 160 Fla. 681, 36 So.2d 364 (1948); Higbee v.
Housing Auth., 143 Fla. 560, 197 So. 479 (1940); Utley v. City of St. Petersburg,
121 Fla. 268, 163 So. 523 (1935).
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Unfortunately, the supreme court, exercising its discretion to do so,
simply denied the petition without taking the opportunity to decide
whether the re-examination type questions are "questions" in a constitutional
sense. 23 If such questions are not reviewable as questions of "great public
interest," re-examination by the supreme court of its prior decisions can
only be obtained when the district court refuses to follow the prior supreme
court decision. Review by certiorari could then be requested on the
"direct conflict theory. '24 This, however, requires that district courts boldly
recede from former decisions of the state's highest court. Reluctance to
do this under the doctrine of stare decisis will deter progress.2 5 Decisions
that have outlived their usefulness should no longer be controlling.
For this reason, it is submitted that "questions of great public interest"
should encompass the re-examination type question when the district
court determines that the petition to certify has merit.
DIRECT CONFLICT JURISDICTION

"The supreme court may review by certiorari any decision of a
district court of appeal that . . . is in direct conflict with a decision of
another district court of appeal or of the supreme court on the same

point of law .... "26
As was probably anticipated, this source of jurisdiction has provided
by far the biggest portion of the district court cases which are sought
to be reviewed by the supreme court.
The court has repeatedly stated the purpose of this provision to be
uniformity in the law.2 The constitution forbids the supreme court's
whimsical selection of cases for review simply because it has some notion
that the decision below was unjust. 28 The conflict jurisdiction limits the
function of the supreme court to that of a "supervisory body"29 which
has as its primary aim the avoidance of conflicts in authority which may
be binding as a precedent on the Florida trial courts.8 0 The court is
not concerned with the rights of the individual litigants or the justice
of the case. 3' Each litigant coming to the supreme court from the district
23. Walker v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 102 So.2d 728 (Fla. 1958).
Although no inferences can ordinarily be drawn from a refusal to issue a writ of
certiorari, one can hardly escape the inference that the supreme court was not yet
willing to recede from its prior decision.

24. See note 1 supra.

25. Reluctance was expressed in Walker v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co.,

101 So.2d 437, 438 (Fla. App. 1958), as follows: "It is our view that such re-

examination should be made by our Supreme Court which first pronounced the
doctrine as the law of Florida."
26. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(2).
27. N & L Auto Parts Co. v. Doman, 117 So.2d 410, 411 (Fla. 1960); Ansin
v. Thurston, 101 So.2d 808, 810 (Fla. 1958); Lake v. Lake, 103 So.2d 639, 642

(Fla. 1958).
28. Ansin v. Thurston, 101 So.2d 808 (Fla. 1958).
29. Id. at 810.
30. South Fla. Hosp. Corp. v.McCrea, 118 So.2d 25 (Fla. 1960).
31. See note 27 supra.
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court has already had one trial and one appellate review by right of appeal.
32
That is said to be sufficient to satisfy the mere requirements of fair justice.
The petition for certiorari must contain an affirmative allegation that
the district court's decision is in direct conflict with the prior decision
or decisions.33 An allegation that the decision below is "in conflict with
34
and by implication seeks to overrule" the prior decision is insufficient.
Where the direct conflict is alleged, the court will examine the district
court's opinion and if there is a prima facie showing of a probable
conflict, the writ of certiorari will be issued. Then, after a more thorough
study of the allegedly conflicting decisions,3 5 aided by oral argument and
briefs, the writ may be discharged, or the decision below may be modified
36
or quashed.
The case of Williams v. Noel a7 should caution the petitioner that
thorough research is necessary before the petition is filed. The petitioner
in Williams asserted that the district court decision was in conflict with
only one prior supreme court decision. After determining that there was
not a conflict as alleged, the petition was discharged."8 As a basis for a
rehearing, it was alleged that the supreme court had overlooked five
additional cases which were not mentioned in the original petition. A
rehearing was denied on the grounds that the appellate rules do not allow
the petitioner for rehearing to rely on a "new ground or position from
that taken in the original argument or briefs upon which the cause
was submitted. . . . The court went on to say that it had not overlooked
the cases mentioned in the petition for rehearing, but had discovered
40
and considered them in the original consideration of the case.
"3

An all-inclusive definition or interpretation of the intent of the word
"conflict" as used in a constitutional sense with reference to "points of
law," is not yet available.4" However, the cases that have interpreted this
provision offer some direction to the prospective petitioner.
32. Lake v. Lake, 103 So.2d 639, 642 (Fla. 1958).
33. Seaboard Airline R.R. v. Branham, 104 So.2d 356 (Fla. 1958).
34. Id. at 358.
35. "The value of a case as a contribution to judicial authority lies, not in
the court's opinion, but in its decision, which is expressed by the judgment and
mandate of the court, the opinion merely states the question submitted to and
considered by the court and general principles of law which the court took as its
guide in determining such questions." 2 FLA. JuR. Appeals § 366 (1955). The
following cases were cited: Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Lakeland, 94 Fla. 347,
115 So. 669 (1927); McKinnon v. Johnson, 57 Fla. 120, 48 So. 910 (1909).
36. Butler v. Cay, 122 So.2d 189 (Fla. 1960); Frank v. Jensen, 118 So.2d 545

(Fla. 1960); Seaboard Airline R.R. v. Branham, 104 So.2d 356 (Fla. 1958).
37. 112 So.2d 5 (Fla. 1959).
38. Id. at 6.
39. FLA. APP. RULE 4.5(c); Williams v. Noel, 112 So.2d 5, 7 (Fla. 1959).
40. Id. at 8.

41. As a good example of how learned writers differ as to when two decisions
are in conflict, compare Roehner & Rochner, Certiorari-What is a Conflict Between
Circuits, 20 U. Cm. L. REV. 656 (1953) and the disagreement with Stem, Denial
of Certiorari Despite a Conflict, 66 HARv. L. REv. 465 (1953). In Florida, it
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In Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota,42 a majority of the court justified
jurisdiction on the basis of a conflict between a district court decision
and obiter dictum as gratuitously announced in a prior supreme court
opinion. Three justices dissented, reasoning that obiter dictum is "not
a prior adjudication of a point of law" 43 as contemplated by the
constitution.
The supreme court will only review a decision of a district court that
is accompanied by an opinion, 44 although it is of no significance, for the
purpose of determining conflict jurisdiction, that the district court of appeal,
in its opinion, failed to consider or discuss the allegedly conflicting decision. 45
In Lake v. Lake,46 the district court disposed of the case with a per curiam
opinion consisting only of the word "affirmed." The supreme court refused
to go behind the opinion and search the record to determine an alleged
conflict.4 7 The district courts of appeal "are and were meant to be
courts of final appellate jurisdiction, ' 4 8 and it is assumed "that an appeal
to a district court of appeal will receive earnest, intelligent, fearless
consideration and decision. 49 Since no rule of law was announced in
the case, there was no possibility of non-uniformity with other decisions
and hence, no constitutional need for review.
A multitude of cases processed through the district courts involved
the so called "substantial evidence rule." 50 This rule presents itself when
there is alleged error in findings of fact, directed verdicts and judgments
notwithstanding the verdict. The issue on appeal in this situation involves
an evaluation or weighing of the evidence. In deciding these issues, a
district court of appeal cannot set a patently irreconcilable precedent as
each case turns upon the quantum and character of evidence available
in the record for the purpose of proving the material facts. Hence, the
cause lacks the vital conflict which is necessary to the jurisdiction of
the supreme court. 51 Neither will the court review the ultimate effect
of the circumstantial evidence and the justifiable inferences to be drawn
52
therefrom as determined by a district court of appeal.
has been stated that in order to invoke the supreme court's power of review te
conflict must be a "real, live and vital" one. Nielson v. City of Sarasota, 117 So.2d
731, 735 (Fla. 1960).
42. 122 So.2d 611 (Fla. 1960).
43. Id. at 615 (dissenting opinion). The dissenting view seems to be in accord
with the rationale of South Fla. Hosp. Corp. v. McCrea, 118 So.2d 25 (Fla. 1960)
and Lake v. Lake, 103 So.2d 639 (Fla. 1958).
44. Lake v. Lake, 103 So.2d 639 (Fla. 1958).
45. Billingham v. Thiele, 109 So.2d 763 (Fla. 1959).
46. 98 So.2d 761 (Fla. App. 1957).
47. Supra note 44.
48. Supra note 44 at 642.
49. Supra note 44 at 643.
50. Where a finding of fact is based on some competent substantial evidence
an appellate court will not overrule the finding. Tomberlin v. City of Miami,
117 So.2d 735 (Fla. 1960); Tucker Brothers, Inc. v. Menard, 90 So.2d 908
(Fla. 1956).
51. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Bell, 113 So.2d 697 (Fla. 1959).
52. Nielson v. City of Sarasota, 117 So.2d 731 (Fla. 1960).
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It is not yet clear whether the court will review a case in which
the alleged conflict arises from' the application of the same principle
of law to reach a different result on the same undisputed material facts.
In Florida Power 6 Light Co. v. Bell, 53 the court stated that review
under these conditions was conceivable. Again in Nielsen v. City of
Sarasota,5 Justice Thornal stated that:
While conceivably there may be other circumstances, the principal
situations justifying the invocation of our jurisdiction to review
decisions of Courts of Appeal because of alleged conflicts are
(1) the announcement of a rule of law which conflicts with a
rule previously announced by this Court, or (2) the application
of a rule of law to produce a different result in a case which
involves substantially the same controlling facts as a prior case
disposed of by this court. Under the first situation the facts are
immaterial. It is the announcement of a conflicting rule of law
that conveys jurisdiction to us to review the decision of the Court
of Appeal. Under the second situation the controlling facts become
vital and our jurisdiction may be asserted only where the Court
of Appeal has applied a recognized rule of law to reach a conflicting
conclusion in a case involving substantially the same controlling
facts as were involved in allegedly conflicting prior decisions of
this court. 55
Yet in N 6 L Auto Parts Company v. Doman,56 which was decided
between the Bell case and the Nielsen case in point of time, the court
held that it would "not look into the facts in order to determine whether
a conflict exists."5 7 The district court of appeal had held 8 that a salesman
was in the course of his employment when he fell and injured himself
while walking from a taxi to his motel room where he was spending the
evening. The salesman was returning from a movie during the late evening
and although the trip to the movie was a personal errand, such deviation
from the course of his employment came to an end when he debarked
from the taxi in front of the motel.5 9 This decision was alleged to be
in conflict with Foxworth v. Florida Industrial Commission.6" In the latter
case, the claimant was attending a business convention in a hotel. He
decided to go to a nearby shopping center in order to purchase some
gifts for his family. On the way out of the lobby, he fell and injured himself.
The supreme court held that the claimant was not within the course
of his employment when he fell, and that the deviation occurred when
he left the chair in which he was sitting. 61 In determining whether the
53. 113 So.2d 697 (Fla. 1959).
54. 117 So.2d 731 (Fla. 1960).
55. Id. at 734.
56. 117 So.2d 410 (Fla. 1960).
57. Id. at 412.
58. N & L Auto Parts Co. v. Doman, 111 So.2d 270 (Fla. App. 1959),
59. See note 56 supra at 411.
60. 86 So.2d 147 (Fla. 1955).
61. Ibid.
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two cases were in conflict, the majority of the court in the Doman case
was of the opinion that in both cases the same principle of law was
.applied; i.e., "when an employee deviates from his employment and is
injured while engaged in a purely personal mission, he is not entitled to
benefits under the workmen's compensation law."'6 2 Therefore, -there was
,no conflict in legal. precedent. Justice Roberts, dissenting, was of the
opinion that the two cases "form patent and irreconcilable precedents,"I65
upon substantially .the same facts. The majority position would have been
more tenable if it had been decided that the facts in the two cases were
not "substantially" the same. 64 However, they apparently deemed it unnecessary .to reach this question, although the dissenting opinion did.. The
majority held merely that they would not look into the facts to determine
a conflict. 5 Hence, it appears, despite what was announced in the Bell
and Nielsen cases, that conflicts arising out of different conclusions in
applying the same principle of law to substantially the same facts, are
not "conflicts" in a constitutional sense.
Where the district court of appeal improvidently exercises its jurisdiction, the remedy of the appellee is a petition to the supreme court
for a writ of prohibition.66 In Diamond Berk Insurance Agency, Inc. v.
Goldstein,6 7 the appellant filed his notice of appeal in the district court
instead of the trial court as provided in the appellate rules. The district
court held 68 that this error did not deprive it of jurisdiction to review the
merits of the case. The appellee petitioned the supreme court for a writ
of certiorari alleging a conflict with Counne v. Saffan.69 The supreme
court held that certiorari was not the proper remedy and granted leave
to the-petitioner to apply for a writ of prohibition which was afterwards
granted70 on the authority of Counne v. Saffan.
Under all the limitations placed upon the review of district court
-decisions, the "conflict" theory offers the disgruntled litigant the most
attractive route for supreme court review. This is understandably so.
It is not too difficult to find in most appellate decisions a point which
lends itself to an argument that it is in conflict with one of the many
prior decisions. 71 While concordance is not always to be expected between
62. N & L Auto Parts Co. v. Doman, 117 So.2d' 410, 411 (Fla. 1960).
63. Id. at 412.
.64. By statute passed in 1959, FL.. STAT. § 440.27 (1959), review of all
workmen's compensation cases will be by writ of certiorari directly to the supreme
court from the Florida Industrial Commission. Perhaps, the supreme court will
have another opportunity to explain the two cases alleged to be in conflict.
65. Supra note 62 at 412. The exception to this statement is the rare case in which
the material facts are "on all fours" with a prior case. See Larnel Builders, Inc.
v. Martin, 110 So.2d 649 (Fla. 1959).
66. Diamond Berk Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Goldstein, 100 So.2d 420 (Fla. 1958).
67. Ibid.
68. Supra note 66 at 421.
69. 87 So.2d 586 (Fla. 1956).
70. State v. Carroll, 102 So.2d 129 (Fla. 1958).
71. See note 41 supra.
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the supreme court's conception of "conflict" and that of the litigants, the
experience thus far would indicate that a more objective and careful
analysis of his case would save the litigant money as well as the court's time.
DECISIONS AFFECTING A CLASS OF CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATE OFFICERS

Only one case has reached the court in which an interpretation
of "a class of constitutional or state officers" 72 was made. In Hakam v. City
of Miami Beach,73 a municipal police officer sought review of a declaratory
decree affecting his rights under the municipality's Civil Service Act. On
appeal, the district court affirmed the circuit court decree without an
opinion. 74 In the petition to the supreme court for review by certiorari,
the police officer asserted that he was a constitutional or state officer
within the meaning of the constitution.75 The petition was denied on the
authority of Lake v. Lake"6 which held that district court decisions without
opinions are not reviewable. However, the court went on to say that
"it is quite obvious that a police officer of a municipal corporation is
not a 'constitutional or state officer' as contemplated by the germane
constitutional provision."7 7 A seemingly safer position would have been
a holding bottomed on the latter reason. Assume that in a subsequent
case a class of constitutional or state officers are affected by a district
court decision rendered without an opinion. Under the rule of the Hakam
case the supreme court would be powerless to review. Furthermore, the
petition for review of the Lake case was based on an alleged conflict
between the district court decision and a prior supreme court decision.
Since there was no opinion, a conflict in announced legal precedents did
not exist. 78 Consequently, there was no need to review the Lake decision,
since the only purpose of the "conflict" jurisdiction is to provide uniformity
in legal precedents. It is submitted that the reason for the provision
permitting supreme court review of decisions affecting a class of constitutional or state officers is the public importance attached to this type
of question. The supreme court should effectuate this purpose without
the self-imposed and unnecessary limitations announced in the Hakam case.
As obiter dictum for informational purposes, the Lake case contained
the following illustrations as cases affecting a class of constitutional or
state officers which would warrant review by the supreme court:
decision relating to all superintendents of public instruction
because of its effect on the school system; one dealing with all
sheriffs because of the effect upon law enforcement; one concerning
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72.

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

FLA. CONST. art.

V, § 4(2).

108 So.2d 608 (Fla. 1959).
105 So.2d 42 (Fla. App. 1958).
Supra note 73 at 609.
103 So.2d 639 (Fla. 1958).
Supra note 73 at 609.
Supra note 46.
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all taxing officials because of the influence upon public finances.7 9
(Emphasis added.)
As the word "class" denotes more than one officer; query, would a decision
affecting the state comptroller's office be properly reviewable by certiorari
since there is only one such officer?
It may be that only those offices created by the constitution or state
statutes come within this provision." In that event, review may be obtainable by right of appeal if the validity of the statute or a construction of
the constitution is in issue.81
CONCLUSION

Undoubtedly, the supreme court is placing a strict interpretation on
its power to review decisions from district courts of appeal. Contrary to
a popular notion, especially among laymen, it is not a higher court of
general appellate review. Neither are the district courts of appeal mere
intermediate courts on the route to the supreme court. With the limitations
placed upon the power of review of the supreme court, the responsibility
of directing and promulgating future Florida law, especially private law,
lies to a great extent with the district courts of appeal.
The supreme court's attitude of not being concerned with the rights
of the individual litigant and the justice of the case is justifiable. First,
the district courts of appeal are quite competent to administer appellate
justice. Additional review for the sake of justice is not necessary. 82 Secondly,
the supreme court could not devote the necessary time and deliberation
to the fulfillment of its obligatory constitutional duties, if it considered
every case in which an interesting legal question arose, or in which the
court was led to the prima facie impression that the decision below
was unjust.
One could only conclude, after reading the number of cases which
failed to show the jurisdiction of the supreme court, that lawyers would
79. Lake v. Lake, 105 So.2d 639 (Fla. 1958).
80. See 8A WORDS AND PHRASES 458 (1951)

and cases cited for such a judicial
construction of a "constitutional or state officer." Cf. Armstrong v. City of Tampa, 106
So.2d 407 (Fla. 1958), which held that a municipal ordinance was not a state statute
within the constitutional provision authorizing direct appeals to the supreme court
in cases involving construction of a state statute; State ex rel. Clyatt v. Hocker,
39 Fla. 477, 486, 22 So. 721, 723 (1897), wherein it was stated that a state officer
is "a person in the service of the government, who derives his position from a duly
and legally authorized election or appointment, whose duties are continuous in their
nature, and defined by rules prescribed by government, and not by contract,
consisting of the exercise of important public powers, trusts, or duties, as a part
of the regular administration of the government, the place and the duties remaining,
though the incumbent dies, or is changed ....
81. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(2).
82. Lake v. Lake, 103 So.2d 639, 642, (Fla. 1958): "The quality of justice
may not be gauged by the treatment accorded one litigant without regard for his
adversary. Justice should be done, but not overdone. When a party wins in the
trial court he must be prepared to face the opponent in the appellate court, but
if he succeeds there, he should not be compelled the second time to undergo the
expensc and delay of another review."
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be well advised to spend a little more time and effort in their petition
demonstrating to the supreme court its jurisdiction to reach the merits
of the decision below. The petitioner, in preparing his petition, should
keep foremost in his mind that review of district courts of appeal decisions
by certiorari is in the interest of the law, its appropriate exposition and
enforcement, and not in the interest of justice to the litigant.

